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We analyze the effect of outsourcing on union wages in a simple two-stage game between
a firm and a union. In contrast to public perception the ease with which the firm can
outsource parts of their production does not necessarily reduce the wage set by the union.
Even in the simple model framework a surprisingly large number of conflicting effects is
established.
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Basic Model 2
1 Introduction
One of the most important phenomena of the recent wave of economic integration is the
rush of firms to outsource an expanding range of activities abroad. In the public debate, the
growing importance of international outsourcing has sparked concerns about detrimental
effects on workers in industrialized countries. Trade unions in western countries fear that
outsourcing will lead to job losses but also to downward pressures on domestic wages.
In particular, the question arises whether the possibility to outsource deteriorates the
bargaining outcome for unionized workers.
In the academic realm, a number of theoretical contributions has shed light on the labor
market effects of international outsourcing (see, for instance, ?, ?, ?). However, the issue of
trade unionism is barely mentioned in these studies. The present paper aims at filling this
gap by providing a theoretical analysis of the effect of outsourcing on wages subjected to
collective bargaining agreements. We develop a simple two-stage game between a monopoly
union and a firm. The union sets wages before the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing
and the level of production.
The framework is closely related to the setup proposed recently by ?. In our approach
firms adapt their outsourcing decision to the bargained wage. On contrary, ? assume that
the degree of outsourcing is already fixed before the wage bargaining takes place. This
assumption is of crucial importance for the results. While they find, among other things,
outsourcing to actually increase union wages, we find that the bargained wage is subjected
to various effects pulling into different directions. The analysis therefore shows that the
issue is more complex than the public debate often suggests.
2 Basic Model
We analyze a two-stage game between a firm and a monopoly union with the stages given
as follows:
1. The union sets wages to maximize its utility function depending on the union wage
premium (w − w¯) and on employment n.
2. The firm chooses the level of output y and the degree of outsourcing k simultaneously.
In ? the two stages are exactly reversed. We believe that it is more reasonable to assume
that the degree of outsourcing adapts to changing market conditions, such as the wage
level. The setting implies that firms have the ’right to manage’, i.e. they can choose the
level of employment unilaterally. The game is solved by backward induction starting at
the second stage.
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2.1 Stage 2: Production and Outsourcing Decision
Consider a firm facing a linear demand function given by
p = a− by. (1)
In order to produce the final good, the firm requires a continuum of intermediary inputs
defined on the interval k ∈ [0, 1]. The firm can either produce an intermediate good at
some wage w or import it from a foreign supplier at cost c. The unit costs of importing an
intermediate good are assumed to be smaller than those of in-house production, i.e. c < w.
The assumption can be thought of as reflecting, for instance, lower foreign wages. Total
unit costs ω are therefore given as
ω = k c+ (1− k)w. (2)
In addition, the firm incurs some fixed costs whenever it outsources a particular task along
the value chain. These costs may include expenditures necessary to find an appropriate
foreign supplier, costs for supervising the contract with the foreign firm etc. The fixed costs
of outsourcing vary with the type of input and are assumed to increase over the interval.
For simplicity, we postulate quadratic fixed costs
G(k) =
1
2
εk2, (3)
with ε denoting an exogenous cost shift parameter. The firm maximizes profits by choosing
output y and the degree of outsourcing k simultaneously. Yet, the maximization problem
reads
max
y,k
{Π = (p− ω) y −G(k)} . (4)
First-order conditions are then given by
k(y, w) =
(w − c) y
ε
, (5)
y(k, w) =
a− ω
2b
. (6)
Equation (5) shows that the marginal benefits from outsourcing are determined by the
product of output and the difference between domestic wages and foreign costs. Hence,
the firm will find it more profitable to outsource the production of intermediate inputs if (i)
sizable cost differences between home and foreign production exist and (ii) the production
level is large. Equation (6) establishes the usual first-order condition for the optimal output
given marginal cost ω.
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Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously yields explicit solutions for k and y de-
pending on the wage level w:
k(w) =
(a− w)(w − c)
2b ε− (w − c)2 , (7)
y(w) =
(a− w) ε
2b ε− (w − c)2 , (8)
where 2b ε > (w − c)2 for stability. Note that higher fixed costs of outsourcing not only
diminish the degree of outsourcing k, but also reduce the output level y because marginal
costs are higher with lower levels of outsourcing (as w > c).We will now analyze the effect
of union wage setting on the decision variables of the firm.
Consider first the effect of higher domestic wages on the degree of outsourcing. Differenti-
ating the first-order condition (5) with respect to k yields
∂k(y, w)
∂w
=
1
ε
[
y + (w − c) ∂y
∂w
]
. (9)
Hence, increasing the domestic wage will induce more outsourcing by the direct effect on the
wage differential (w−c). However, there is a second, potentially negative effect, which works
through the effect of domestic wages on the production level. A potential decline in output
following higher domestic wages will reduce the marginal benefit of importing intermediate
goods and therefore lower k. The total effect of higher union wages on outsourcing is then,
perhaps surprisingly, ambiguous.1 From now on, we will assume that the positive effect
prevails and higher domestic wages induce outsourcing.2
We now turn our attention to the effect of union wages on output. Taking the first derivative
of equation (6) with respect to w gives
∂y
∂w
= − 1
2b
[
(1− k)− (w − c) ∂k
∂w
]
. (10)
If outsourcing is not feasible (i.e. k = 0), equation (10) reduces to − 1
2b
. Higher wages
increase marginal costs and therefore lower output. With positive levels of outsourcing
marginal costs are partly exogenous and are thus not influenced by union wage setting.
Hence, the negative (direct) effect of higher union wages on output is dampened by the
factor 1− k. In addition, there is an (indirect) effect of wages on output working through
the impact of wages on the outsourcing decision. A higher degree of outsourcing reduces
marginal costs and therefore increases output. The total effect is indeterminate.
1 ∂k(w)
∂w =
2(a−w)(w−c)2+(2bε−(w−c)2)(a+c−2w)
(2bε−(w−c)2)2 ≤≥ 0
2A necessary and sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is that a ≥ c+ 4bε(w−c)2bε−(w−c)2 , i.e. market size
must exceed some threshold level. The main findings of the paper are not affected by this assumption.
However, the effects of some channels identified in proposition 1 will change if the negative effect
dominates. Detailed results for this case can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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2.2 Stage 1: Wage Determination
At the first stage the monopoly union sets the wage as to maximize a standard utility
function
max
w
{U = n(w − w¯)} , (11)
where w¯ denotes the outside option of domestic workers. The domestic employment level
is given by total output multiplied by the share of production remaining in-house
n = (1− k) y. (12)
Plugging equation (12) into (11) and differentiating with respect to w gives the following
first-order condition:
n = −(w − w¯) ∂n
∂w
⇔ (1− k) y = −(w − w¯)
(
(1− k) ∂y
∂w
− ∂k
∂w
y
)
. (13)
The marginal benefit of an increase in wages is equal to the employment level while the
marginal costs are given by the wage premium multiplied by the resulting loss in employ-
ment. In contrast to a model without outsourcing the union also takes into account the
effect of wages on the share of production that is produced domestically. This effect is
not present in the paper by ?, since their study assumes that the outsourcing decision has
already been made when wage bargaining takes place.
We establish the main result of this paper by analyzing the effect of exogenous shifts in the
cost parameter ε on the union’s first-order condition. The higher ε is the lower k will be
for any given wage level. For very large values of ε outsourcing is no credible option for the
firm. Hence, we study to which extent the ease (in terms of costs) of the firm to outsource
parts of its production influences union wages. Taking the first derivative of equation (13)
with respect to ε gives
(1− k) ∂y
∂ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− ∂k
∂ε
y︸︷︷︸
(2)
= (w − w¯)
∂k∂ε ∂y∂w︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
− (1− k) ∂
2y
∂w∂ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
+
∂2k
∂w∂ε
y︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)
+
∂k
∂w
∂y
∂ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6)
 . (14)
Proposition 1 Increasing the costs of outsourcing has an ambiguous effect on the wage set
by the union. We can distinguish the following channels through which wages are affected:
1. Higher costs of outsourcing increase marginal cost of production thereby decreasing the
level of output. This decreases employment and the marginal benefits of an increase
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in wages. Consequently, the union tends to set lower wages.
2. Higher values of ε decrease k. For a given output level, domestic employment and
marginal benefits increase. The union responds by increasing wage demands.
3. Outsourcing partly exogenizes marginal production costs. With ∂y
∂w
< 0
(
∂y
∂w
> 0
)
higher union wages cause smaller decreases (increases) in the demand for domes-
tic labor for high levels of outsourcing.3 Higher outsourcing costs dampen this effect
by lowering k and therefore induce the union to set lower (higher) wages.
4. The negative effect of higher wages on output (and thus employment) is exacerbated by
higher costs of outsourcing as it becomes more difficult for firms to resort to foreign
suppliers. Marginal costs of demanding high wages increase and the union sets a
lower wage rate.
5. Higher outsourcing costs impede firm’s ability to outsource when facing high domestic
wage rates. Hence, the employment loss of a marginal increase in w shrinks and the
union increases its wage demand.
6. 6. Parts of the marginal costs for unions implied by higher wages are caused by the
resulting increase in k. These marginal costs are lower for a low level of output that
results from high outsourcing costs. Hence, the union tends to set higher wages in
the presence of higher outsourcing costs.
Proof 1 See Appendix.
3 Conclusion
In the present paper we have analyzed the effect of outsourcing on wages of unionized
workers in a simple two-stage game between a firm and a monopoly union. In contrast to
public perception the ease with which the firm can outsource parts of their production does
not necessarily reduce the wage set by the monopoly union. In fact, even in the simple
model framework a surprisingly large number of effects pulling into different directions
are established. Hence, careful empirical research is needed to establish the net effect of
outsourcing on union wages.
3This is the effect driving the results of ?.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The directions of channel one, two, five and six follow directly from equation (14) and the
results of section 2.1. It remains to be shown that ∂
2y
∂w∂ε
< 0 and ∂
2k
∂w∂ε
< 0. Calculating the
latter derivative explicitly gives
∂2k
∂w∂ε
=
2b (a+ c− 2w)
(2bε− (w − c)2)2 −
4b [2(a− w)(w − c)2 + (2bε− (w − c)2)(a+ c− 2w)]
(2bε− (w − c)2)3 . (15)
The second term on the right hand side of equation (15) is positive by the assumption
∂k
∂w
> 0. In order to show that the total effect is indeed negative, we distinguish between
two cases: 1. a+ c− 2w < 0 and 2. a+ c− 2w > 0. In the first case the negativity of the
derivative follows immediately. For the second case we have to show that the first term is
smaller than the second one. Therefore,
2b(a+ c− 2w)(2bε− (w − c)2) ≤ 4b [2(a− w)(w − c)2 + (a+ c− 2w)(2bε− (w − c)2)] ,
⇔ (a+ c− 2w)(2bε− (w − c)2) ≤ 4(a− w)(w − c)2 + 2(a+ c− 2w)(2bε− (w − c)2)
⇔ −(a+ c− 2w)(2bε− (w − c)2) ≤ 4(a− w)(w − c)2
This condition is satisfied by assumption. The negativity of ∂
2y
∂w∂ε
can then be easily estab-
lished by differentiating equation (10) with respect to ε and using ∂
2k
∂w∂ε
< 0. 
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